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Summary 
Participation of small businesses in the market for public contracts is widely recognized 
as a key policy issue. It is also commonly held that the adoption of e-procurement 
solutions can be effective in pursuing such an objective. To this end, we analyze the 
transactions completed in the period 2004-2007 through the Italian Government’s e-
procurement platform, that is, the marketplace managed by the Italian Public 
Procurement Agency (Consip S.p.A.). Although descriptive statistics indicate that micro 
suppliers are the most represented group of firms in the marketplace, our econometric 
treatment provides some evidence that the former are less successful than all other 
suppliers in getting public contracts. Degree of loyalty with buyers, location and the use 
of other MEPA negotiation tools, also emerge as relevant factors of success in the e-
procurement market. 
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1. Introduction 
 
E-procurement is increasingly recognized as an effective tool to reduce purchasing costs and 
streamline  processes  in  both  private  and  public
2  sector.  According  to  the  European 
Commission’s estimates, “if online procurement is generalised, it can allow governments to 
save up to 5% on expenditure and up to 50-80% on transaction costs for both buyers and 
suppliers”.
3 
The  recent  trend  of  demand  aggregation  (that  is,  centralization)  in  public  procurement  – 
witnessed by the several central purchasing bodies created in the early 2000 in Europe and in 
the  U.S.  –  is  often  accompanied  by  a  more  intensive  use  of  e-procurement.
4  Coupling 
centralization  with  e-procurement  may,  in  fact,  improve  the  efficiency  of  procurement 
processes (Somasundaram, 2004). Well designed e-procurement strategies, moreover, are able 
to  soften  potentially  adverse  effects  of  centralization  –  such  as  hampering  smaller  firms’ 
access to the procurement markets – and therefore can encourage full participation of all firms 
in the competition for public contracts. One of the most pressing issues in the political agenda 
is indeed to reconcile (increased efficiency from) demand aggregation with a more extensive 
participation of smaller firms.
5  
After Consip S.p.A. (Consip henceforth) was mandated by the Italian Government to operate 
as a central procurement agency in 2000, Italy has been among the first countries in Europe to 
raise the challenge, seeking for the most effective ways to pursue at the same time a greater 
demand  aggregation  and  participation  of  smaller  firms  in  the  procurement  market.  The 
Governments’ e-procurement platform (the Italian acronym being MEPA), launched in 2003, 
is arguably the most important e-procurement tool designed so far. By exploiting the benefits 
of web-based/internet procurement, Consip took the role of a “market maker”, by setting up 
an  e-marketplace  for  acquisitions  below  the  EU  threshold.
6  The  Marketplace  connects 
thousands of public bodies (PBs), both at a central and local level, distributed all over the 
Italian territory with a currently large set of micro and small, but also medium and large 
suppliers. Public bodies and suppliers have today access to a free trading platform – an “open 
market” – populated by many potential sellers/buyers other than those usually present in each 
geographical area.  
                                                 
2 In the EU, the possibility for public administrations to use electronic procurement systems was formalized by 
the European Directive 18/2004 (Point 12 of introduction).  
3 See the EU “Action plan for the implementation of the legal framework for electronic public procurement” 
(2004). See also Moon (2005) for a discussion on the determinants of e-procurement in centralized systems. 
4 Empirical evidence from Moon (2005) suggests that centralization is one of the main determinants of the 
diffusion of e-procurement. See Dimitri, Dini and Piga (2006) for a more detailed discussion of centralization 
trends in public (and private) procurement. See also Carpinenti, Piga and Zanza (2006) for an overview of 
central procurement agenciess in Europe, in the U.S. and the more recent patterns in Latin America. 
5 In the U.S., for instance, the Small Business Act (SBA) in the U.S. promotes full participation of small firms in 
the federal (and non-federal) public procurement market. It also monitors that public agencies achieve the set-
aside objectives set by the law. 
6 €137.000 is the threshold for supply and services.   3 
The Marketplace enables PBs to purchase directly from e-catalogues of qualified suppliers or 
to compare products and prices by making Requests for Quotations (RFQs). In 2007, the 
volume of all purchases completed through the MEPA since its launch in 2003 achieved €160 
Millions.  Pushed  also  by  recent  legislative  modifications
7  –  that  made  the  use  of  the 
Marketplace compulsory for central public bodies – the MEPA is playing a key role in the 
Italian  public  e-procurement  scenario,  absorbing  about  80%  of  annual  e-catalogue-based 
transactions of all Italian PBs.
8 
 
After five years of activity, the level of development of the MEPA allows us to open the 
“black box” and start analyzing what has happened, especially in terms of structure of the 
supply  and  characteristics  of  most  active  suppliers.  Looking  at  available  data  concerning 
RFQs, transactions appear rather concentrated in the hands of a restricted pool of suppliers. 
Despite concentration, data exhibit a great dispersion in the number of awarded contracts. 
This is essentially due to the fact that, despite active bidding, about 25% of suppliers is never 
awarded  a  contract,  while  the  top  1%  accounts  for  more  than  20%.
9  One  issue  worth 
addressing is indeed the identification of the characteristics of this set of “top suppliers” and, 
symmetrically, what factors affect the low or non-success of many other suppliers. In more 
general terms, we look at the determinants of suppliers’ success in the MEPA. In answering 
this question we will also be able to investigate whether (and in what direction) firm’s size is 
a relevant characteristics for success, therefore providing some insights on the effective role 
of the MEPA in promoting the inclusion of smaller firms in the market for low-value public 
contracts.  
To this end, we analyze a unique, large sample of 3.360 RFQs completed in the Marketplace 
during the period 2004-2007. Basic descriptive statistics show that “micro” suppliers, defined 
as those with at most 9 employees, are arguably the most represented group of firms in the 
Marketplace, absorbing 61% of RFQs and 42% of the volume of the overall transactions. 
However, when controlling for i) bidding for a RFQ, ii) location, iii) revenue and iv) other 
characteristics, the picture appears rather different. Measuring suppliers’ performance with 
the frequency of awarded contracts (Y) over the sample period, estimations suggest that the 
predicted value of Y varies with the firm’s size in a direction that is not in favour of the 
smallest suppliers (i.e., micro suppliers). Most performing suppliers are non-micro suppliers 
(small,  medium  and  large)  based  in  the  North,  more  inclined  to  serve  a  selected  pool  of 
purchasing  PBs.  Small  and  medium  enterprises  (SMEs)  appear  as  performing  as  large 
suppliers. Micro suppliers are, instead, significantly less performing than all other suppliers. 
                                                 
7 This is due to the recent Italian Financial Law for the 2008. 
8 See the final Report of the Osservatorio B2B - Politecnico di Milano, for an analysis of e-procurement in the 
Italian Public Sector (www.osservatori.net). 
9 Henceforth we will use RFQ and contract interchangeably.    4 
Location,  size  and  degree  of  loyalty  with  buyers  emerge  therefore  as  relevant  factors 
explaining performance. 
Descriptive statistics also suggest that public bodies located in historically less developed 
areas tend to award a large fraction of contracts to non-local suppliers. Public bodies tend to 
purchase from non-local suppliers only if these are more efficient or more able to fit their 
needs. One possible explanation of this finding is that the efficiency advantage of non-local 
suppliers more that compensate higher transaction/transportation costs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first survey the economic literature on e-
procurement  and  e-platforms.  In  Section  3  we  describe  the  MEPA’s  institutional/legal 
framework and stated goals. Section 4 is dedicated to the evolution and the performance of 
the MEPA in the period 2004-2007, with focus on the dynamics of transactions, volumes, and 
registered users (demand side). In Section 5 we look in more detail at the supply side, in terms 
of number, and size and performance of suppliers. After a brief description of the estimation 
methodologies, Section 6 presents the results on the determinants of suppliers’ performance. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
  
2. Related Literature 
 
To our knowledge this is the first paper that investigates empirically policy issues in the field 
of public e-procurement. Most of the economic and business research on e-procurement is 
concentrated  on  popular  online  platforms  such  as  the  one  of  eBay  and  Amazon.  These 
marketplaces  are  today  well  developed.  In  the  last  ten  years,  they  have  been  providing 
theorists with puzzling phenomena to ruminate, and econometricians with valuable data to 
analyze, IT experts/engineers with ideal environments to study technological evolutions and 
applications  for  e-commerce.  B2G  and  other  public  e-procurement  marketplaces,  instead, 
have been launched only recently by public authorities.
10 Economic research in this area is 
therefore only at its infancy. Nonetheless, economists and e-business researchers have already 
started addressing important issues. Some of the most fertile fields of research are across 
economics and business. One is the relationships between e-procurement and centralization 
(Somasundaram 2004, Subramaniam and Shaw 2003, and Neef 2001). Another field is the 
determinants of e-procurement (Moon, 2005). Dimitri, Dini and Piga (2006) present a survey 
on these topics.  
Despite  the  economic  literature  on  e-platforms  being  very  recent,  research  has  already 
produced  insightful  results.  Most  theoretical  research  relates  to  the  field  of  “two-sided 
                                                 
10  Some  of  the  most  important  public  e-platforms  in  the  USA,  such  as  Myflorida  Marketplace  and  North 
Carolina@yourservice, were built up in 2002-2003. Consip itself was activated at the end of 2003. See Caripenti, 
Piga and Zanza (2006) for a benchmarking on public e-procurement platforms.   5 
markets”. In this field, researchers have mainly focused on two main issues known as the 
“chicken and egg problem” (Armstrong 2006, Gaudeul and Jullien 2001, Rochet and Tirole, 
2004,  and  Jullien  2005),  and  “competiting  e-platforms”  (Caillaud  and  Jullien  2003,  and 
Rochet and Tirole 2003). The empirical literature on e-procurement focuses mainly on big 
B2B platforms for which valuable data are available. Most papers look at the issue of price 
formation in e-auctions (such as the ones performed by eBay and Amazon) and the effects of 
online reputation/feedback mechanisms on participation and bidding behaviour. The role of 
online feedback mechanisms has also been extensively analyzed. Jullien (2006), Dellarocas 
(2007) and Bajari and Hortacsu (2004) provide extensive surveys on the topic.  
 
 
3. MEPA: The Institutional Context 
 
Italy  was  one  the  first  EU  countries  to  adopt  an  e-procurement  regulation.  With  the 
Presidential  Decree  No.  101/2002  the  Italian  Government  introduced  the  use  of  digital 
procedures in public procurement allowing the Italian public sector to perform acquisitions 
below  the  EU  threshold  through  the  Public  Administration  Marketplace.  The  MEPA  was 
created  to  promote  electronic-based  procurement  and  to  streamline  purchasing  processes. 
More  generally,  it  aims  at  “updating”  the  culture  and  the  practice  of  public  purchasing 
management. 
The MEPA is conceived, at its core, as a complementary tool with the set of framework 
contracts that Consip awardes on behalf of PBs for acquisitions above the EU threshold.
11 
Very  often  small  firms
12  cannot  handle  high-value  framework  contracts,  usually  resulting 
from demand aggregation of many PBs.
13 As a result, the Italian policy makers created the 
MEPA in order to have micro and SMEs in a better position to be awarded public contracts 
below the EU threshold. 
The Marketplace is open to qualified suppliers according to non-restrictive selection criteria. 
After  qualification,  suppliers'  catalogues  are  uploaded  into  the  MEPA,  displayed  in  a 
dedicated web site and thus made available to the entire community. Suppliers can provide a 
non-binding geographical area of coverage for their business. Catalogues are presented in a 
standardized template in order to make easier for PBs the evaluation of different products. 
Any  PB  freely  registers  to  the  Marketplace,  browses  catalogues,  compares  products  and 
                                                 
11 Since 2000 Consip operates as a central public procurement station for the acquisition of goods and services 
(works are excluded),  
12 Hereforth, we will use firms and suppliers interexchangeably. 
13 The idea that big framework contracts represent an entry barrier to participation of smaller firms is a widely 
accepted view.  However, empirical evidence  supporting or confuting this is to our knowledge absent.  First 
evidence  of  this  effect  are  in  Albano,  Dini,  Zampino  (2008)  who  empirically  test  the  relationship  between 
participation and contract value in the context of IT services contracts awarded by a large public buyer. Results 
indicate that large contract value discourage participation and at the same time favours joint bidding.   6 
prices,  makes  requests  for  quotation  or  purchases  directly  from  e-catalogues.  The  entire 
transaction  process  is  digital,  supported  by  digital  signature  in  order  to  ensure  legal 
compliance and overall transparency of process. Figure 1 provides a conceptual scheme of the 
Marketplace.  The  MEPA  is  not  fee  free.  Business  is  financed  through  the  Ministry  of 
Economy and Finance’s (MEF) transfers to Consip. 
 
Potential advantages to PBs would include: 
·  reduction of purchasing and transaction costs; 
·  development of human capital; 
·  broadening of suppliers base; 
·  enhanced transparency and ease of comparison among different goods/services; 
·  purchases logging and subsequent expenditure monitoring. 
     
Potential advantages for suppliers include: 
·  selling  cost  reduction  (due  to  broadening  of  potential  customers  base,  lower 
intermediation costs and free digital platform); 
·  major visibility with respect to the span of PBs; 
·  B2G introduction in addition to existing B2B and B2C.  
·  extending the platform of potential buyers. 
 
Figure 1 - MEPA: the conceptual scheme 
 
 
3.1. E-procurement tools in the MEPA 
Public bodies can purchase goods and services on the MEPA by means of two alternative 
tools: 
·  Direct Purchase (DP); 
·  Request for Quotation (RFQ). 
The DP allows the PB to buy directly from the e-catalogue at a pre-fixed (i.e., posted) price. It 
is usually adopted to purchase very low-value items. It can also be suitable when the PB 
needs to satisfy urgent needs thus avoiding delays generated by a competitive procedure. The   7 
RFQ is a competitive selection procedure through which the PB solicits all qualified
14 or a 
certain  group  of  suppliers  to  submit  a  tender.  Responding  suppliers  provide  both  a  price 
quotation and the details of technical/quality improvements when required. The contract is 
awarded to the most preferred price-quality combination without using an explicit, that is, 
publicly  announced,  scoring  rule.  Thus  PBs  have  some  discretionary  power  in  awarding 
RFQs. Contracts may be awarded to a supplier who is not first in the price ranking of the 
product but, for instance, offers valuable services that are not offered by other suppliers (e.g., 
fast shipping) or is able to deliver it at lower costs. A RFQ is then conceived as a way to 




4. Evolution of the MEPA in the period 2004-2007. 
 
At the end of 2007 the MEPA achieved the following results: 1.250 registered Purchasing 
Units (PUs)
15, more than 52.000 transactions (including both RFQs and DPs), for a total value 
of about €160 Millions (see Table 1). In 2007, all business indicators improved considerably. 
Transaction volumes doubled with respect to 2006 and the number of transactions became 2.5 
time the value of 2006. The exponential growth of the last year is also due to the 2007 Italian 
Financial  Law  that  made  compulsory  the  use  of  MEPA  for  some  PBs  (mainly  central 
government). The average value per transaction was €2.640 in 2004 and 2.969. In the sample 
period 2004-2007 the average value increased up to €3.048 (+15%). 
 
Tab. 1 – Number of Transactions and values (2004-2007)
16 
Year   2004  2005  2006  2007  Cumulative 
Transactions  3.143  9.675  11.467  28.168  52.453 
Millions of €  8,3  29,90  38,04  83,64  159,88 
   
Table 2 illustrates the evolution of PU registrations to the marketplace. Registrations have 
been steadily growing over the three years. In early February 2008, PUs were almost 5.900, 
with an increase of about 457% with respect to 2004. One important indicator is the growth of 
“active” PUs. A PU is defined active if it has purchased at least once in the current year. 
Active users were 1.097 in December 2005, 1.253 in 2006. In 2007, they achieved 2.726 
(+118%  over  2006):  about  50%  of  registered  PUs  adopted  the  MEPA  for  at  least  one 
purchase. 
                                                 
14 That is, all suppliers that were qualified to sell the category of products included in the RFQ. 
15 Purchasing Units are departments, structures or other units belonging to the same public body. The Purchasing 
Unit is the lowest level of authority endowed with "budget power" in the Italian Public Administration. 
16 Source: Bertini L. and A. Vidoni (2007).   8 
“Loyals”, namely those users who have bought at least once in the current and in the previous 
year, were 600 in 2006 and 714 in 2007. However, in 2007 the share of loyal PUs over active 
(714/2726) is 26%. In 2007 the fraction of loyal over active halved with respect to 2006. This 
is  because  the  number  of  registrations  increased  significantly  and  much  more  than  the 
“loyals” because of the new rules making the MEPA compulsory for central bodies. 
 
Tab. 2 - Purchasing Units in the period 2004-2007 
  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 (10/02) 
Registered  1.288  1.038  601  2.185  228 
Cumulative 
Registered 
1.288  2.326  2.927  5.653  5.888 
Active  -  1.097  1.253  2.726  - 
Loyal  -  -  600  714  - 
New Entry  -  -  653  2.012  - 
   
On the supply side, 1.293 (active) suppliers are registered in the MEPA, accounting for a total 
of 2050 e-catalogues (as of January 2008)
17. ICT and office supplies represent a large fraction 
of total catalogues (78%) as reported in Table 3. 
 
Tab. 3 - Distribution of catalogues for supplies, 2008. 
At January 2008: 1.293 Stayers; 2050 catalogues uploaded 
ICT  Office  Services  Health materials  Others 
43.5%  34.5%  14%  1%  7% 
      
 
5. The supply side: basic statistics 
 
Before investigating the determinants of suppliers’ performance we provide an overview of 
the supply side of the MEPA. We look in more detail at the information contained in the large 
sample of transactions drawn from MEPA in the period 01/2004-05/2007. This period does 
not include transactions made under the regime of compulsory introduced by the Financial 
Law 2008.
18   
Table 4 reports a summary of the sample data. We focus our attention on purchases performed 
through RFQs. There are several reasons to have a closer look at RFQs rather than DPs:  
·   they explain the greater part of total transaction volume (65%); 
                                                 
17 Source: internal reporting system.  
18 The obligation to use the MEPA is after July 1
st, 2007.   9 
·   by looking at direct purchases we only observe the selling supplier (who is committed 
to sell at a predetermined price that is posted in the e-catalogue), whereas the analysis 
of RFQs reveals how and when all invited suppliers respond and, most importantly, 
who are most successful suppliers;  
·   the  use  of  discretionary  power  by  PUs  may  reveal  the  latter’s  purchasing 
patterns/preferences.  
 
Tab. 4 – Summary of the sample (January 2004 – May 2007). 
  Volume  %  N. transactions  %  Average value 
RFQ  € 50.557.040  65%  3.360  14%  € 15.046,74 
DP  € 26.997.540  35%  20.188  86%  € 1.337,31 
Total  € 77.554.580  100%  23.548  100%  € 3.293,47 
 
 
The dataset comprises detailed information on 3.360 RFQs and 1.351 invited suppliers. 1053 
suppliers are invited to provide quotations for a “single” category of supply (e.g., ICT). 281 
out of 1053 suppliers were invited to submit proposals for a “bundle” of supplies , 50% of 
which regarded the bundle ICT + office materials). 425 out of 1053 placed a bid after PUs 
invitation.  Table  5  shows  the  distribution  of  suppliers  by  dimension  as  measured  by  the 
number of employees.
19 
Table 5-6 report that micro suppliers are 54% of total active suppliers in our sample, covering 
61% of awarded RFQ and 42% of total transaction volume. Total transaction volume declines 
with  size.  Micro  suppliers’  volume  is  7  times  higher  than  large  suppliers’  (Figure  2). 
However, the average value of awarded contracts increases with the supplier’s size (Figure 3). 
This suggests that small suppliers are awarded many low-value RFQs, while larger suppliers 
are awarded few but larger RFQs. 
Tab. 5 - Distribution of suppliers (01/2004-05/2007) 
Firm Size  Freq.  Percentage  Cum. 
Micro  529  53.87  53.87 
Small  287  29.23  83.10 
Medium  103  10.49  93.58 
Large  63  6.42  100.00 
Total  982  100.00   
 
                                                 
19 Since we do not have data on revenues and on participation/control, the classification by size is only based on 
the number of employees. We use the EUROSTAT classification: micro [0-9], small [10-49], medium [50-249] 
and large [≥250].    10 
Tab. 6 - Distribution of RFQs by suppliers’ size 
Size  N. of awarded RFQ  Average value of awarded RFQ  Total Value of 
awarded RFQ 
Micro  2060  
(61,3%)  € 10.241,9  € 21.098.232 
(41,8%) 
Small  850  
(25,4%)  € 18.289,6  € 15.546.192 
(30,7%) 
Medium  361  
(10,7%)  € 29.678,3  € 10.713.869 
(21,2%) 
Large  89  
(2,6%)  € 35.940,9  € 3.198.747 
(6,3%) 
Overall  3.360  € 15.046,7  € 50.557.040 
 
Figure 2 – Distribution of awarded RFQ value by suppliers’ size 
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Table 7 reports the distribution of firms by size and localization. Several things are worth 
noting. Suppliers located in the North are the ones most present into to the MEPA for any 
given size: 35%, 49%, 53% and 43%, respectively from small size towards large size. Micro, 
small  and  medium  suppliers  represent  85%  of  total  firms.  Micro  firms  are  the  most 
represented in all geographical areas (ranging from 45% to 74%).    11 
Northern regions “contribute” more to suppliers participation, but this contribution is more 
focused on medium/large suppliers. Overall, the presence of medium-large and very large 
firms is modest and rather concentrated in the more developed areas of the country (Center 
and North-West). These numbers suggest that the MEPA seems to achieve its important target 
of “hosting” a large number of micro and small suppliers.  
 
Tab. 7 – Firms’ area vs. firms’ size 
  Suppliers’ Size 
Suppliers' location  micro  Small  Medium  large  Total 
Center  185 
(59%)  82  32  13  312 
Islands  76 
(74%)  21  2  4  103 
North-East  72 
(46%)  56  20  8  156 
North-West  114 
(45%)  86  35  19  254 
South  82 
(56%)  42  14  7  145 
n.a.  0  0  0  12  12 
Total  529 
(53,8%)  287  103  63  982 
     
In table 8, we match localization of suppliers with that of PUs. We thus obtain a sort of 
“regional business balance”. The North is the area awarding the highest fraction of contracts 
(through  RFQs)  to  local  suppliers  (approx.  74%).  It  is  interesting  noting,  however,  that 
Southern regions and Islands are those most purchasing from non-local suppliers, 27% and 
32%, respectively. 
 
Tab. 8 - Business Balance (awarded RFQs from 01/2004 until 05/2007). 
  Suppliers' location (Italy) 
PUs' location  Center  Islands  North  South  n.a.  Total 
Center  1.085  46  738  86  2  1.957 
  (55.4%)  (2.4%)  (37.7%)  (4.4%)  (0.1%)  (100.0%) 
Islands  107  147  159  44  4  461 
  (23.2%)  (31.9%)  (34.5%)  (9.5%)  (0.9%)  (100.0%) 
North  263  25  907  27  9  1.231 
  (21.4%)  (2.0%)  (73.7%)  (2.2%)  (0.7%)  (100.0%) 
South  150  24  224  156  1  555 
  (27.0%)  (4.3%)  (40.4%)  (28.1%)  (0.2%)  (100.0%) 
Total  1.605  242  2.028  313  16  4.204 
  (38.2%)  (5.8%)  (48.2%)  (7.4%)  (0.4%)  (100.0%)   12 
6. Suppliers’ performance 
 
Plot 1 and Table 9 show the frequency distribution of RFQs among suppliers (number of 
suppliers on y-axis for given number of awarded RFQs on x-axis). Two things are worth 
noting: dispersion and concentration. Out of 425 “interested” suppliers, namely those who 
placed at least a bid, roughly 90 were awarded no contract, while 3 suppliers were awarded 
more than 100 RFQs. While 20% of suppliers is awarded no RFQs and 50% of them are 
awarded just 2 RFQs, the “top” 25% is awarded the largest fraction of the contracts. Although 
the average number of RFQs is 7.9, variance is extremely large (453.5). The frequency of 
suppliers declines with the number of awarded contracts. On the one hand, data indicate that 
many suppliers competing in the market for RFQs are completely unsuccessful. On the other 
side, data also indicate that RFQs are rather concentrated in the hand of few suppliers (the 
first 25%, roughly 106) among which 4 suppliers (1%) are awarded the 20% of total RFQ 
(693/3.360),
20 with 3 out of them experiencing outstanding performance (much above 100 
RFQs each).  
Our  main  goal  is  to  identify  the  characteristics  of  “top  25%”.  To  this  end,  we  exploit 
information on suppliers’ characteristics (such as size, location, loyalty, revenue from the 
MEPA  etc.)  that  preliminary  statistics  seem  to  indicate  as  the  most  relevant  factors  in 
explaining the differences in the number of awarded contracts. 
 
 











                                                 
20 See the details on RFQ counts in table 9.  
21 Here, only suppliers who placed a bid after invitation to quote from the PU are considered (i.e., participation 
>0). The same holds for plot 1.  
Percentiles  N. Suppliers  Smallest     
1%  0  4.25  0     
5%  0  21.25  0  Obs.  425 
10%  0  42.5  0  Sum of Wgt. 425 
25%  1  106.25  0     
50%  2  212.5    Mean  7.9 
      Largest  Std. Dev.  21.29 
75%  6  318.75  86     
90%  19  382.5  151  Variance  453.5 
95%  28  403.75  188  Skewness  7.2 
99%  85  420.75  268  Kurtosis  71.9   13 

















































6.1. Methodology: the Count Data Approach 
In many economic environments, the dependent variable of interest is a non-negative integer 
or count which the researcher wishes to explain in terms of a set of covariates. With respect to 
the classical regression model, the dependent variable (y) is discrete with a distribution that 
assigns probability mass at non-negative integer values only (Cameron and Trivedi, 1999). 
Standard OLS are no longer feasible to analyze these data. Regression models for counts, as 
well as other discrete models such as the logit and probit, become more suitable, as their 
properties are strictly connected to discreteness and nonlinearity. 
Count data models are appropriate for measuring the “frequency” of occurrence of an event. 
A classical example comes from demography, in which fertility is usually modelled as the 
number of live births over a given age interval of the mother. The demographer is interested 
in analyzing how fertility varies with the mother’s schooling, age, and household income, etc. 
Accident analysis studies model airline safety, for example, as measured by the number of   14 
accidents experienced by an airline over some period, and wishes to examine its relationship 
to airline profitability and financial health. 
The analysis of frequencies implies controlling for the risk – exposure – that the event may 
occur. In the example of fertility, the exposure is the age of the mother, while in the case of 
airline accident is the number of flights in the period.
22 
Count data approach is the most appropriate for our dataset. Our dependent variable is the 
number of times (Y) each supplier is awarded an RFQ, so we refer to it as the proxy for his 
performance (or success) in the MEPA. Suppliers’ performance is controlled for participation 
(exposure) to the RFQ. Exposure is then the number of times each supplier bids for a contract 
and,  therefore,  is  exposed  to  the  likelihood  of  being  awarded  a  contract.  That  is,  while 
analyzing the number of times each supplier is awarded a contract we control for the number 
of  times  he  bids  for  an  RFQ:  winning  10  contracts  of  course  would  have  a  completely 
different meaning if bidding occurred 10 times instead of 100 times! 
Non-linearity  and  discreteness  are  key  features  of  models  for  count  data.  Plot  1  clearly 
indicates this to be the case for our sample. Models for count data, such as Poisson
23 or 
Negative Binomial regressions, appropriately account for such features by working with the 
logs  of  dependent,  given  the  original  exponential  form  of  independent  variables.
24  The 
Poisson model imposes the restriction that the conditional variance equals the expected value 
of  the  dependent  variable  [ ] [ ] var E Y Y l = = .  However,  this  restriction  is  often  rejected  in 
economic applications.
25 This is our case as shown in table 9: the variance is much greater 
than  the  mean  (453.5>7.9),  displaying  the  classic  “overdispersion”  trouble.  In  case  of 
overdispersion,  Cameron  and  Trivedi  (1986)  suggest  to  use  the  Negative  Binomial  (NB) 
regression,
26  which  relaxes  the  assumption  about  mean-variance  equality,  by  including  a 
                                                 
22 Applications of such models are quite common in the economic literature. Cameron A.C., P.K. Trivedi, Milne 
and Piggott (1988) apply the count data approach to analyze the determinants of the choice of health insurance 
type and types of health care services in Australia, using micro-level data from the 1977-78. Other applications 
to heath care are due to Cameron and Windmeijer (1996) and Freud, Kniesner and LoSasso (1996, 1998).  
23 The Poisson distribution is a discrete probability distribution that expresses the probability of a number of 
events occurring in a fixed period of time (distance, area, etc.) if these events occur with a known average rate 
(l) and independently of the time since the last event. 










= =  for y=0, 1, 2, …;  ( ) ( ) ; 0 y y f y f y l = =  otherwise. 
24  [ ] /
X E Y X e
b =  where E[.] is the expected count of the dependent variable conditional to the vector of 
covariates (X) and b is the vector of estimated coefficients. See Greene (2003) for a basic treatment of these 
models. See also Cameron and Trivedi (1986) and Cameron and Trivedi (1998) for an overview of standard 
models for count data. 
25 Another assumption in the Poisson regression is that the events must be independent in the sense that the 
occurrence of one event will not impact the occurrence probability of another event. We are not able to assess 
how much this assumption holds in our case. However, the single RFQ awarding event (per supplier) may be 
reasonably thought independent from the outcomes of someone else; if a form of dependence there was, it would 
be due to the supplier’s past performance in previous contracts. 
26 The Negative Binomial distribution is a discrete probability distribution that expresses the probability of a 
number of events occurring in a fixed period of time (distance, area, etc.) according to following distribution   15 
stochastic term (ei) in the parameter mi, where ei follows a gamma distribution. In the NB 
regression, the variance is equal to 
2 m am + , where  m  is the mean of the dependent variable 
and  0 a ³  is known as the overdispersion parameter. The NB allows the econometrician to 
account  for  some  unobserved  heterogeneity  among  individuals  that  may  help  explaining 
dispersion and model this complex form of heteroskedasticity. Indeed, the term a permits the 
form  of  heteroskedasticity  where  the  conditional  variance  exceeds  the  conditional  mean, 
which is prevalent in count data. The NB model collapses into Poisson specification as a 
approaches zero.
27 The NB model is appropriate to gain consistent estimators even if there is 
some  heterogeneity  in  the  data.  This  heterogeneity,  however,  should  not  be  due  to  a 
permanent unobservable effect. If it was the case, permanent heterogeneity would present 
itself as persistent serial correlation in the residuals (Blundell et al., 1995). Furthermore, if 
qualitative difference between transition from zero events to the first occurrence and from the 
first to further occurrences was reasonably supposed in our data, a more complicated model 
specification would need. Green (1994) shows the suitability of zero-inflated models if there 
is  a  two  stage  process  governing  occurrences.  The  former  stage  would  lead  to  structural 
treatment of the binary event between being awarded or not. Fortunately, this is not our case. 
In fact, we have at most 20% of zero occurrence on 425 observed suppliers. The Vuong test
28 
does not support the hypothesis that the excess of zero is a problem in our data.  
 
As  shown  in  the  next  section,  the  test  does  not  reject  the  hypothesis  of  overdispersion, 
suggesting  that  the  NB  model  is  more  appropriate  for  our  data.  Fitting  NB  regression  is 
similar to fitting Poisson regression, therefore the log of the mean m, is a linear function of 
independent variables.  
We define the incidence rate (ir) as the average number the event occurred given the times it 
could have occurred: 
Count of events 
( )
N. of times event could have occurred
r i i = ,                                        (1) 
 
where the denominator is the “exposure”. We model the logarithm of the incidence rate as a 
linear function of more explanatory variables: 
                                                                                                                                                          




f y f y r p p q
y
-  
= = -  
 
 for y=0, 1, 2, …;  ( ) ( ) ; , 0 y y f y f y r p = =  otherwise; where 











m am = = +  , assuming 
1
r
a = . 
27 NB model is thus a robust generalization of the Poisson. 
28 The computed value is V = 0.50, 0.26 for ZIP and ZINB models, respectively. See Vuong (1989) for details on 
this tests.   16 
ln( ) ' r i i i i x b e = × + .                                                        (2) 
 
Alternatively, the model describes logs of expected event counts: 
 
ln(expected count) ln(exposure ) ' i i i i x b e = + × + ,                                   (3) 
 
such as:   ln( ) ln( ) ' i i i i N x m b e = + × + .                                                                          (4) 
 
NB regression finds the maximum-likelihood estimates of the b parameters. We recall that: 
·  ln(mi)-ln(Ni)=ln(mi/ Ni) is the log of the conditional mean of the number of awarded 
contract for each supplier “i”;  
·  ‘xi is the vector of explanatory variables; 
·  b b b b is the vector of estimated coefficients for each covariate; 
·  e e e ei    is  an  individual  unobserved  heterogeneity  effect  to  control  for  variance.  This 
component plays a double role of measuring both the specification error (as in the 
classical linear regression model) or the kind of cross sectional (i.e. cross-suppliers) 
heterogeneity. 
 
The  vector  of  explanatory  variables  is  a  set  of  variables  capturing  the  individual 
characteristics of suppliers: 
·  ln(MEPA_revenue)  measures  the  suppliers’  overall  turnover  (in  terms  of  natural 
logarithm to smooth absolute gaps) realized on the MEPA since their registration on 
the platform. This can be a proxy of the size of the supplier in the specific context of 
the MEPA. It is computed on the total revenue from both RFQ and DP sales. We 
expect this number to be positively correlated with the number of awarded RFQs. 
·  DP_Num is the number of direct sales through DPs realized in the sample period. 
This variable proxies how performing is the supplier in the other selling tool offered 
by the MEPA. The level of performance in DPs may help us to say something about 
the  suppliers’  performance  in  RFQs.  A  positive  coefficient  indicates  that  good 
performance  in  DPs  may  help  being  performing  also  in  RFQ  (RFQ  and  DP  are 
somewhat complementary). A negative coefficient might indicate that the supplier is 
more specialized in one of the two (the tools may be substitutes). 
·  PU_Num: number of different PUs served by each supplier. This variable measures 
whether the supplier sells to many different PUs rather than a restricted pool of PUs.  
It is the number of unique PUs the supplier interacted with in the sample period, 
including both RFQs and DPs. This variable is a proxy for loyalty between suppliers 
and PUs, thus measuring whether and how the degree of loyalty impacts suppliers’   17 
success in being awarded an RFQ. The variable may give some understanding of the 
nature of success. A negative correlation means that, all else being equal, success goes 
in  the  same  direction  of  interacting  with  few  PU  but  repeatedly.  A  positive 
correlations may instead indicate that success goes in the direction of less frequent 
interactions, but with many different PUs.  
·  Dummy_firm_nord: this dummy equals 1 if the supplier is located in the North of 
Italy, 0 otherwise. The dummy captures the contribution of geographical location to 
success. As Figure 4 suggests, suppliers located in the North – especially North-East, 
the Italian most developed industrial area – appear more successful than those located 
in other areas (they experience higher awarding rates, i.e., higher number of awarded 
contracts/number of invitations to bid from PUs). 
·  Dummy_micro_firm:  this  dummy  equals  1  if  the  supplier  is  a  micro  firm  [≤9 
employees], 0 otherwise. This dummy variable is constructed following indications 
from Figure 5. Micro suppliers are awarded a lower number of contracts with respect 
to all other suppliers, while SMEs and large suppliers display comparable success 
rates. Awarding rates for micro firms appear much lower with that of all others’ (about 
0.2 vs. 0.3).
29  
·  Dummy_outlier_RFQ: there are 3 suppliers who are awarded a significantly higher 
number of RFQs with respect to everyone else (over 100 RFQs each). It can be the 
case that these suppliers face with some very specific features that allow them to be 
much more performing than all other suppliers, thus we control for this outlier factor. 
·  RFQ_Partec: is the exposure variable in our model. This is the number of times each 
supplier bid/responded to an invitation to quote from purchasing units. This variable is 
not  directly  included  in  the  estimation  of  the  parameters,  however  is  taken  into 
appropriate account for its calibration by the estimation procedure. 
 
Figure 4. Awarding rates by firms’ location 












                                                 
29 The awarding rate is equal to the number of awarded RFQs over the number of times suppliers placed a bid 
after the invitation to quote from the PU.   18 
Figure 5. Awarding rates by firms’ size 











In this section we present the results of a number of model specifications in order to check the 
robustness of regression analysis. As it is shown in table 10 the Wald test indicates largely 
significant coefficients in the model of interest, even if accounting for the variance of awarded 
RFQ. The variance is much greater than the mean, therefore, revealing that the distribution of 
the  dependent  variable  is  clearly  affected  by  considerable  overdispersion  (this  is  also 
confirmed by likelihood ratio tests). 
The large value for c
2 (1034) as goodness-of-fit confirms this conjecture and suggests that the 
Poisson distribution is not a good choice for our data.
30 However, we first treat overdispersion 
by adjusting standard errors with the square root of the Pearson c
2 dispersion (see the second 
column of estimations in table 10). The coefficients, identical to the previous analysis, display 
standard errors adjusted for the overdispersion in the Poisson model. Coefficients show a 
decrease in z-scores, but all keep a very high statistical significance. An alternative solution to 
scaling the standard errors would be to use the NB regression, which is usually appropriate as 
discussed above. Estimated coefficients still show a reduction in z-scores, but preserve an 
appropriate statistical significance. The direction of correlations are confirmed all over the 
regression models. Estimation results are reported below in column 3 of table 10. 
 
Estimated coefficients measure how the expected number of awarded RFQ vary as covariates 
vary. In particular we can interpret the regression coefficients as a difference between the logs 
of expected counts. Formally, this can be written as 
0 1 0 ln( ) ln( ) x x b m m
+ = - , where the subscripts 
indicate the points in which the predictor variable x is evaluated (at x0+1 and x0, implying a 
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 
, which allows 
us to interpret coefficients in terms of the log of the ratio of expected counts. The exposure 
                                                 
30 The likelihood ratio test for a=0 (table 10, column III) is a test of the over-dispersion parameter a. When this 
parameter is zero the negative binomial distribution is equivalent to a Poisson distribution. In the case, a is 
significantly different from zero and thus reinforces that Poisson distribution is not appropriate.   19 
term allows us to be more rigours, by interpreting the regression coefficients as the log of the 









   
 
 arising from the one unit change in the regressors. 
Coefficients indicate that revenue, location, size, loyalty and direct purchases significantly 
affect suppliers performance. The estimated predicted number of awarded RFQs is about 1.9 
for  each  supplier  on  average  over  the  explanatory  variables.  It  is  worth  noting  how  this 
number varies in response to variation of the independent variables (table 10, column 6).  
For instance, being located in the North allows the supplier to increase of 0.517 his expected 
number  of  awarded  RFQ  that  is:  roughly  +27%  (≈0.517/1.919).  Being  a  micro  supplier, 
however,  reduces  the  number  of  expected  awarded  RFQs  of  0.31,  more  or  less  of  16%. 
Indeed, the incidence rate ratios (IRR) show straightforward the effects (intensity, signs and 
significance  are  confirmed  overall  model  specifications)  on  expected  contracts  award 
occurrences.  Revenue  also  has  a  sizeable  positive  impact  (+18%).  The  signs  of  direct 
purchases  and  the  number  of  different  purchasing  units  are  consistent  with  the  expected 
directions, despite they show very modest in size (+0.001% and -0.004%, respectively). 
The role of firm’s size is somewhat surprising given the preliminary statistics (see table 6) 
according to which micro firms absorb 61% of total RFQs. Despite absorbing more than 60% 
of RFQ, regressions indicate that micro firms are the least successful suppliers in the MEPA. 
One possible explanation for this is that micro suppliers absorb a great part of the transactions 
simply because they are statistically more present in the marketplace than all other suppliers. 
This might also suggests that each (of the many) micro suppliers is awarded a very limited 
number  of  RFQs.
31  Instead,  many  RFQs  are  awarded  to  other,  arguably  less  represented 
suppliers. 
The variable PU_Num has a negative sign but quite weak impact (-0.004). This suggests the 
existence of some loyalty effects in MEPA. The negative sign seems to confirm that suppliers 
interacting with a limited number of unique PUs experience an increase in the expected value 
of awarded RFQs.
32 
The log of the overall transaction value (MEPA_revenue) is also largely significant in our 
estimations  (+0.162)  and  with  positive  sign  it  goes  in  the  direction  of  higher  revenues 
associated to higher number of transactions (instead of less transactions of higher value). The 
log-log formulation allows us to interpret the coefficient as an elasticity. That is, 1% increase 
in  revenue  is  associated  to  a  16%  increase  in  expected  number  of  awarded  contracts. 
Suppliers’ transaction value is a proxy for their relative size with respect to the MEPA. High-
MEPA revenue suppliers are also more performing than low-MEPA revenue suppliers. 
                                                 
31 Except three micro firms which account for the three largest counts of awarded contracts (over 100 contracts). 
32 It would be interesting investigating casualty effects, i.e., whether is success to drive repeated interactions or 
vice-versa.    20 
The number of DPs – the proxy of performance with respect to the alternative MEPA selling 
tool  –  does  not  seem  to  influence  suppliers’  performance  on  the  RFQ  side,  although  its 
significance is kept in the transition between Poisson models to Negative Binomial. However, 
this does not necessarily exclude some complementarities between the two as long as the 
positive sign is maintained across the different estimation techniques.  
Model 4 in table 10 aims at capturing some potential bias effect of the three most successful 
suppliers  (three  suppliers  collected  over  100  RFQs  each).  The  outlier  dummy  control, 
however, is not significant although the estimates still exhibits robustness. 
In  summary,  evidence  suggests  that  most  successful  suppliers  are  non-micro  suppliers, 
located in the most developed areas of the country (North of Italy), interacting with a limited 
(“privileged”) pool of administrations. Interestingly, a non-micro supplier located in the North 
is expected to be successful roughly 45% more than micro supplier located in the South. 
Revenue from MEPA and good performance on DPs side also arise as additional factors of 
success. 
 
Table 10. Estimation of RFQ with alternative count data regression models 
RFQ_Number Regressions 
  I.  II.  III.  IV.  V.  VI. 













































































Outlier_RFQ  -  -  -  -0,347 
(-1,13)  -  - 







(-10,33)  -  - 
RFQ_Partec  exposure = ln(RFQ_Partec) 
             
Obs.  425  425  425  425  425  - 
LR chi
2  342,44  -  64,22  65,56  64,22  - 
Pseudo R
2  0,14  -  0,036  0,036  0,036  - 
Goodness-of-fit 
Chi
2  1034,17  -  -  -  -  - 
(1/df) Deviance 
(1/df) Pearson  -  2,468 
2,847  --  --    - 








z-scores shown in parentheses; significant levels at *0.10, **0.05, ***0.01. 
(x2) Generalized Linear Modeling for Poisson distribution scaled with standard errors using square root of the 
Pearson chi-square dispersion, in order to deal with the over-dispersion. 
(3) Marginal effects after “nbreg”; y = predicted number of events (1,919) and dy/dx = marginal effects at the 
means of the independent variables, also for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.   21 
Robustness of our results is confirmed by comparing magnitude and statistical significance of 
coefficients under different prediction models. Coefficients vary a little when estimating by 
Poisson rather than NB. Plot 3 compares graphically model predictions and count observed 
distribution. Robustness of estimations are still confirmed. The graph displays predictions of 
NB and Poisson models, and either fit well the observed data. 
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In this paper we have analyzed the suppliers’ performance in the MEPA.  
The regression analysis supports some basic intuitions about the direction of effects of the 
variables influencing suppliers’ performance. Location, revenue and loyalty play a relevant 
role in explaining success. More successful firms appear those located in the North, having 
large  revenue  in  the  MEPA,  and  interacting  with  a  selected  pool  of  purchasing 
administrations. Quite surprisingly, success varies with the supplier’s size in a direction that is 
not in favour of the most represented group suppliers. Micro suppliers appear less successful 
than all other suppliers. Micro suppliers is awarded a limited number of RFQs in relation to 
the number of times bidding occurs. Among all other suppliers, small, medium and large 
suppliers show similar patterns of performance. 
 
Our paper is the first step to understand what is driving suppliers’ success in the MEPA, and 
in general, what could be at the root of suppliers’ performance in MEPA-like marketplaces. A   22 
full analysis of this issue can be important for providing policy indications to market makers 
and marketing insights to suppliers for business/selling strategies.  
One point worth highlighting is that the increase of suppliers’ base constantly over time might 
not  be  sufficient  to  achieve  well  developed  and  functioning  e-procurement  platforms  if 
contracts end up awarded to a very restricted pool of suppliers. Potential concerns may arise if 
part of this phenomenon relates to factors other than suppliers’ efficiency or ability to satisfy 
buyers’ needs, as local favouritism. One adverse consequence could be the early exit of some 
suppliers that may lower the level of competition in the future. 
 
Further research will extend the analysis of performance to account for these and other factors 
that we are aware may play a role in explaining suppliers’ success in the MEPA. For instance, 
investigating whether success is driven by efficiency rather than favouritism would help the 
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